

Message Text

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 3 BRASILIA 9714

NODIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: OCIP (VANCE, CYRUS), BR, US
SUBJECT: SECRETARY'S VISIT: WORKING LUNCHEON

1. THIS MESSAGE REPORTS THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE SECRETARY AND FOREIGN MINISTER SILVEIRA AT THE HEAD TABLE DURING THE WORKING LUNCH AT THE RESIDENCE FOR THE SECRETARY'S VISIT TO BRASILIA ON NOVEMBER 22, 1977. IT HAS NOT BEEN CLEARED BY THE SECRETARY.

2. PARTICIPANTS:

UNITED STATES	BRAZIL
THE SECRETARY	FOREIGN MINISTER ANTONIO AZERDEO DA SILVEIRA
AMBASSADOR TO BRAZIL	
JOHN HUGH CRIMMINS	AMBASSADOR JOAO HERMES PEREIRA DE ARAUJO, CHIEF, DEPARTMENT
POLITICAL COUNSELOR	OF THE AMERICAS
ALFONSO ARENALES (NOTETAKER)	COUNSELOR JOSE NOGUEIRA FILHO, POLITICAL ADVISER TO THE MINISTER (NOTETAKER)

3. AFTER BRIEF PRELIMINARY EMENITIES, THE SECRETARY OPENED THE CONVERSATION, WHICH WAS CONDUCTED IN DESCRETE SEGMENTS.
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4. OIL PRICES:

THE SECRETARY SAID HE WAS VERY CONCERNED ABOUT THE NEXT ROUND OF OPEC OIL PRICE DISCUSSIONS. HE SAID WE HAD TALKED OR WOULD BE TALKING WITH MOST OF THE PRODUCING COUNTRIES, AND HE WOULD BE DEVOTING SPECIAL ATTENTION TO THIS QUESTION WITH PRESIDENT PEREZ IN VENEZUELA TOMORROW. HE STATED THAT THE SAUDIS,

KUWAIT AND THE EMIRATES WOULD GO ALONG WITH A PRICE FREEZE AND THE SHAH HAD TOLD PRESIDENT CARTER THAT HE WOULD, TOO. HE CONSIDERED VENEZUELA THE KEY COUNTRY NOW.

5. SILVEIRA SAID THAT PEREZ, DURING HIS NOVEMBER 16-19 VISIT TO BRAZIL, HAD TALKED QUITE A BIT ABOUT PETROLEUM, BUT IN A VERY SELF-INTERESTED SENSE. HE ALSO TALKED A LOT ABOUT LATIN AMERICAN INTEGRATION, AND SEEMED TO WANT TO INTEGRATE EVERYTHING -- EXCEPT PETROLEUM. HE SPOKE OF HELPING BRAZIL WITH ITS PETROLEUM NEEDS, MENTIONING 100,000 BARRELS A DAY, UP FROM THE "RIDICULOUS" 25,000 BARRELS A DAY NOW BEING SUPPLIED. BRAZIL DID NOT REALLY BELIEVE HE WOULD COME THROUGH WITH THIS, BUT THAT IS WHAT PEREZ HAD SAID. IN RESPONSE TO THE SECRETARY'S QUESTION, SILVEIRA SAID THE ONE THING PEREZ DID NOT TALK ABOUT WAS PRICES. AFTER SOME PRODING BY THE SECRETARY AND AMBASSADOR CRIMMINS, SILVEIRA ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE GOB HAD NOT RAISED THE OIL PRICE QUESTION WITH PEREZ.

6. THE SECRETARY NOTED THE NEED FOR ALTERNATE ENERGY SOURCES, AND MENTIONED THAT IRAN WAS SEEKING NEW SOURCES. WITH REGARD TO IRAQ, SILVEIRA COMMENTED THAT BRAZIL WAS THE FIRST IMPORTER OF IRAQI OIL, ACKNOWLEDGING THAT IT PAYS FOR IT IN KIND AND AGREEING AFTER SOME DISCUSSION THAT BRAZIL AND IRAQ HAVE WHAT IS ESSENTIALLY A BARTER ARRANGEMENT. SILVEIRA MENTIONED THE MAJOR OIL STRIKE THE PETROBRAS' INTERNATIONAL SUBSIDIARY HAD MADE IN IRAQ. SILVEIRA ALSO REPORTED THAT PEREZ HAD SUGGESTED THAT BRAZIL AND

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VENEZUELA ENGAGE IN JOINT EXPLORATION OF THE ORINOCO TAR BELT -- AND EXTREMELY EXPENSIVE VENTURE. AMBASSADOR CRIMMINS NOTED THAT, AS OF 1972 INVESTMENT FOR EXPLOITATION HAD BEEN ESTIMATED TO BE IN THE RANGE OF \$20 BILLION OVER THE FIRST FIVE YEARS. THE SECRETARY NOTED THAT THE SHAH WISHES TO CONCENTRATE ON THE PRODUCTION OF PETROCHEMICALS, WHERE HE BELIEVES THE FUTURE OF THE PETROLEUM INDUSTRY LIES.

7. SADAT VISIT TO ISRAEL:

TURNING TO MIDDLE EASTERN DEVELOPMENTS, THE SECRETARY SAID THAT THE SADAT VISIT TO ISRAEL WAS HAVING A PROFOUND PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACT AND THAT IT WAS PRODUCING A MAJOR CHANGE IN ISRAELI PERCEPTIONS, AT LEAST WITH REGARD TO EGYPT, ON PROSPECTS FOR PEACE. HE SAID IT WAS HAVING A SIMILAR EFFECT ON ISRAELI ATTITUDES WITH REGARD TO SUSPICION OF EGYPTIAN MOTIVES, AND THAT IT SEEMED TO BE ALLAYING THE DEEPLY INGRAINED ISRAELI MISTRUST OF EGYPT. SILVEIRA SAID THAT ISRAEL WOULD HAVE TO PAY FOR THIS, HOWEVER -- THAT SADAT MUST GET SOMETHING TO TAKE BACK TO EGYPT OR IT WOULD BE VERY MUCH THE WORSE FOR HIM AND THE PROSPECTS FOR PEACE. THE SECRETARY AGREED, NOTING THAT IT IS TOO EARLY TO CONCLUDE THAT SADAT WILL GET NOTHING IN RETURN. AMBASSADOR CRIMMINS ASKED IF SADAT'S RECEPTION IN ISRAEL WAS REALLY AS

ECSTATIC AS REPORTED IN THE MEDIA. THE SECRETARY SAID THAT THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE VISIT WAS ITS MOST IMPORTANT ASPECT, ADDING THAT THERE HAD BEEN SOME DIMINUTION OF THE ORIGINAL EUPHORIA WITH WHICH ISRAELIS HAD REACTED, BUT THAT IT WAS ACCURATE TO SAY THAT MANY IN ISRAEL STILL COULD NOT QUITE BRING THEMSELVES TO BELIEVE THAT SUCH A THING COULD HAPPEN. SILVEIRA BELIEVED THAT IT WAS TOO EARLY TO EVALUATE THE RESULTS OF THE VISIT, INCLUDING ITS IMPACT ON OTHER COUNTRIES IN THE AREA. IN COMMENTING ON OTHER COUNTRIES, THE SECRETARY STATED THAT THE JORDANIANS AND THE SAUDIS WERE THE LEAST MILITANT, AND THAT THE PRINCIPAL PROBLEMS WERE POSED BY THE SYRIANS, THE IRAQIS AND THE LIBYANS, AND ESPECIALLY WITH THE LATTER TWO.

8. THE SECRETARY SAID THAT PRIME MINISTER BEGIN WAS VERY TIRED
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AND THAT THERE WOULD NOW BE A 24-HOUR REST PAUSE. HE ADDED THAT, MEANWHILE, WE WOULD BE IN TOUCH WITH SADAT TO SEE WHAT IDEAS MIGHT BE DEVELOPED NEXT. SILVEIRA SAID THAT SADAT HAD BEEN VERY SKILLFUL IN CONSTRUCTING HIS SPEECH TO THE KNESSET, SPEAKING AS AN ARAB RATHER THAN LAYING OUT A SEPARATE EGYPTIAN POSITION. THE SECRETARY AGREED, COMMENTING THAT IT SEEMED THAT WEST BANK REACTION WAS COMING AROUND. HE NOTED THAT THE SYRIANS WERE STILL SAYING THAT THEY WANTED TO NEGOTIATE, BUT THE LIBYANS AND IRAQIS WERE COMPLETELY HOSTILE.

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9. THE SECRETARY SAID THAT SADAT WAS TAKING SOUNDINGS BEFORE

DELIVERING HIS SPEECH TO HIS NATIONAL ASSEMBLY ON HIS RETURN TO CAIRO, AND THAT HE WAS ALSO TRYING TO GIVE BEGIN SOME TIME. SILVEIRA SAID THAT THE BRAZILIAN EMBASSY IN TEL AVIV HAD REPORTED THAT BEGIN'S SPEECH WAS A POOR ONE. THE SECRETARY AGREED, SAYING THAT PERES' SPEECH HAD BEEN BETTER AND MORE FLEXIBLE. HE OBSERVED, HOWEVER, THAT IT WAS IN ANY EVENT EASIER FOR PERES, WHO WAS A MODERATE, TO SAY WHAT HE HAD SAID WHEREAS BEGIN HAD BEEN LOCKED INTO HIS POSITION FOR SOME TIME.

10. SILVEIRA SAID THAT THERE WAS A DANGER THAT THE ARABS WILL WANT TO FORCE UNIFICATION THROUGH WAR. THE SECRETARY REPLIED THAT THEY CANNOT GO TO WAR WITHOUT SADAT -- HE HOLDS THE KEY TO THE SITUATION. SILVEIRA ASKED RHETORICALLY WHAT IF SADAT WERE TO LOSE THE SUPPORT OF THE OTHERS? HE WENT ON TO SAY THAT HE UNDERSTOOD THE PROBLEM WE HAD IN PLAYING A MEDIATING ROLE AND OUR POSITION IN RELATION TO THE PARTIES, NOTING THAT WE SHOULD, HOWEVER, BE FEELING SOME SATISFACTION. THE SECRETARY SAID WE WERE HAPPIEST THAT AT LEAST TWO OF THE PARTIES WERE NOW TALKING TO EACH OTHER. THERE WAS GENERAL AGREEMENT THAT PRESSURES ON ISRAEL TO AVOID INTRANSIGENCE HAD BEEN INCREASED BY SADAT'S VISIT.

11. SILVEIRA OBSERVED THAT EVERYONE WAS TIRED OF THE SITUATION. THE EMOTIONAL WAY IN WHICH SADAT'S INITIATIVE HAD BEEN RECEIVED IN BOTH ISRAEL AND EGYPT SHOWED THIS. THE SECRETARY AGREED, SAY-
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ING THEY WERE TIRED NOT ONLY OF WAR BUT OF THE SERIOUSLY ADVERSE EFFECT OF CONSTANT TENSION ON THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC PROBLEMS OF THE AREA AS WELL. HE SAID THAT ALL THE LEADERS HE HAD SPOKEN TO HAD TOLD HIM THAT ARMS EXPENDITURES CONTINUE AT SUCH A HIGH RATE THAT THEY WERE ALL CONCERNED ABOUT THEIR ABILITY TO STAY IN OFFICE UNDER SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES.

12. PANAMA CANAL:

THE SECRETARY SAID HE WOULD LIKE TO BRING SILVEIRA UP TO DATE ON THE PANAMA CANAL TREATIES. HE SAID THAT WE DISCERNED THAT THERE WAS A SHIFT IN PUBLIC OPINION UNDERWAY IN THE UNITED STATES. PEOPLE WERE GRADUALLY COMING TO UNDERSTAND THE FACTS OF THE MATTER AND WERE BEGINNING TO ACT ON THEM RATHER THAN ON SHEER EMOTION. WE WERE STARTING TO SEE A CHANGE BOTH IN THE POLLS AND IN THE SENATE. FOR EXAMPLE, THE BYRD GROUP OF SEVEN SENATORS (ALL OF WHOM HAD BEEN ON THE FENCE) ARE NOW INDICATING, AFTER THEIR RETURN FROM PANAMA, THAT THEY WILL VOTE FOR THE TREATY. WE ARE STEPPING UP OUR PUBLIC AFFAIRS EFFORTS. THE PRESIDENT, MEMBERS OF THE ADMINISTRATION, AND INDIVIDUAL SENATORS, INCLUDING SOME OF THOSE IN THE BYRD GROUP, WILL BE SPEAKING AROUND THE COUNTRY. THE SECRETARY ESTIMATED THAT THE MATTER WOULD PROBABLY BE ABLE TO COME TO A VOTE SOMETIME AROUND FEBRUARY OR MARCH.

13. SILVEIRA ACKNOWLEDGED THE HIGHLY EMOTIONAL CONTENT OF THE

ISSUE, NOTING THAT IT DERIVES FROM THE TIME WHEN THE UNITED STATES BEGAN THRUSTING OUT INTO THE WORLD. HE CAUTIONED THAT THE MATTER SHOULD NOT BE BROUGHT TO A VOTE UNTIL THE ADMINISTRATION WAS ABSOLUTELY SURE THAT IT COULD WIN. HE NOTED (AS HE HAS ON NUMEROUS PREVIOUS OCCASIONS) THAT HE THOUGHT WE HAD OVEREMPHASIZED THE WHOLE ISSUE. HE EXPLAINED THAT ITS SOLUTION WAS CERTAINLY NOT GOING TO RESOLVE ALL OF THE PROBLEMS BETWEEN THE US AND LATIN AMERICA, BUT THAT, IN VIEW OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES, FAILURE TO RATIFY THE TREATIES WOULD BE MUCH WORSE FOR THESE RELATIONS THAN THE ABSENCE

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OF ANY TREATY AT ALL.

SILVEIRA ADDED THAT SUCCESS ON THE ENERGY BILL WOULD HELP CREATE A POSITIVE ATMOSPHERE, AS WOULD THE SADAT VISIT. HE NOTED, HOWEVER, THAT HE HAD BEEN SURPRISED AT THE LACK OF SUPPORT FOR THE TREATIES AMONG AMERICANS WITH WHOM HE HAD DEALT DURING HIS RECENT VISIT TO THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY. THUS, HE SAID, IF THE PRESIDENT SHOULD FAIL ON THE ENERGY BILL HE SHOULD TAKE HIS TIME WITH THE TREATIES. HE NOTED THAT THE PRESIDENT HAD SUSPENDED HIS TRIP IN ORDER TO PRESURE CONGRESS ON THE ENERGY BILL AND THEREFORE HAD TO BE SUCCESSFUL.

14. THE SECRETARY SAID THE PRESIDENT WOULD GET THE BILL, BUT THE QUESTION WAS HOW STRONG ITS PROVISIONS WOULD BE. HE GUESSED THAT THE ISSUE WOULD NOT BE RESOLVED UNTIL QUITE CLOSE TO CHRISTMAS. HE EXPLAINED TO SILVEIRA SOME OF THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE SENATE AND HOUSE VERSIONS OF THE BILL, WHICH WOULD HAVE TO BE RESOLVED IN CONFERENCE COMMITTEE. HE CORRECTED SILVEIRA'S BELIEF THAT MORE OFTEN THAN NOT CONFERENCE COMMITTEE REPORTS WERE REJECTED BY ONE OR THE OTHER HOUSE. THE SECRETARY STATED THAT AN ISSUE THAT WAS GIVING SOME CONCERN NOW WAS THAT POSED BY THE COALITION OF ELEMENTS ON THE RIGHT AND THE LEFT WHO WERE OUT TO GUT THE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS (IFIS). HE OBSERVED THAT WE WERE NOW FIGHTING THIS PROBLEM, WHICH IS A DIFFICULT ONE TO HANDLE BECAUSE THE ELEMENTS ON EITHER END OF THE SPECTRUM ARE MOTIVATED BY TOTALLY DIFFERENT REASONS.

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15. CARIBBEAN DEVELOPMENT. THE SECRETARY THEN ASKED SILVEIRA ABOUT BRAZIL'S ROLE AND THINKING CONCERNING THE CARIBBEAN DEVELOPMENT EFFORT. SILVEIRA SAID THAT BRAZIL WAS CONSULTING ABOUT IT AND THAT IT HAS A PROBLEM: HE SAID THAT HE UNDERSTOOD THAT TRINIDAD HAD PRESENTED A PLAN WHICH WE HAD NOT ACCEPTED. HE ASKED THE SECRETARY IF THAT WAS THE CASE. THE SECRETARY SAID THAT THERE HAD BEEN A PROBLEM BUT THAT IT WAS ON THE WAY TO SOLUTION. PART OF THE PROBLEM WAS THE QUESTION OF WHAT BANK WAS TO BE USED FOR COORDINATION OF THE DEVELOPMENT EFFORT. SILVEIRA WAS UNDER THE IMPRESSION THAT IDB WAS AND WOULD BE PERFORMING THE COORDINATING ROLE, BUT THE SECRETARY NOTED THAT IT WAS THE WORLD BANK THAT WOULD DO THE JOB. SILVEIRA SAID THAT WE APPEAR TO HAVE SWITCHED FOCUS FROM TRINIDAD TO VENEZUELA AND JAMAICA. THE SECRETARY SAID THAT WE HAD ASKED THE TRINIDADIANs TO TALK WITH US ABOUT THEIR CONCERNS, TO LET THE WORLD BANK BE THE UMBRELLA, AND TO SEE HOW THINGS COULD BE WORKED OUT THAT WAY. SILVEIRA NOTED THAT HE HAD BEEN IN TRINIDAD, READY TO LEAVE FOR CARACAS, WHEN PRESIDENT PEREZ ASKED HIM TO DROP IN, OBSERVING IN AN ASIDE THAT THAT WAS HOW THE PEREZ VISIT TO BRAZIL CAME ABOUT. HE SAID THAT PEREZ HAD TALKED ABOUT EVERYTHING BUT CARIBBEAN DEVELOPMENT.

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16. THE SECRETARY SAID THAT HE HAD TALKED AND WRITTEN TO ERIC WILLIAMS ABOUT THE CARIBBEAN EFFORT. THE SECRETARY AND SILVEIRA AGREED ON THE EXTREME SENSITIVITY WITH WHICH WILLIAMS GUARDS HIS POSITIONS AND HIS ROLE IN THE CARIBBEAN AND THAT HE IS A DIFFICULT MAN TO DEAL WITH. SILVEIRA SAID, HOWEVER, THAT WILLIAMS SEEMED TO BE COMING AROUND A BIT, OBSERVING THAT AS FAR AS HE HIMSELF WAS CONCERNED IT WAS BETTER TO HAVE A SOCIALIST COUNTRY ONE COULD LIVE WITH RATHER THAN ONE OF THE OTHERS.

HE POINTED OUT THAT BRAZIL WAS HELPING THE TRINIDADIAN WITH CREDITS AND THAT IT WAS PARTICIPATING IN FISHING PROJECTS AND A STEEL MILL. THE SECRETARY SAID THAT HE HOPED THAT BRAZIL WOULD PARTICIPATE IN THE MEETING IN WASHINGTON CALLED BY THE WORLD BANK FOR DECEMBER 14. SILVEIRA SAID THAT HE HAD A PROBLEM SIMILAR TO ONE WE HAD FROM TIME TO TIME IN THE U.S., THAT IS, THE FOREIGN MINISTRY WAS IN FAVOR, BUT THE "TECHNICIANS" (READ FINANCE MINISTRY) WERE AGAINST THE PROPOSAL. THAT WAS WHY HE WAS MOVING SLOWLY. AMBASSADOR CRIMMINS NOTED THAT ASSISTANT SECRETARY TODMAN WAS GOING TO BE MAKING A SWING AROUND THE CARIBBEAN AFTER THE STOP IN CARACAS AND THE DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM WOULD BE VERY PROMINENT IN HIS TALKS. IN CONCLUDING THIS SEGMENT OF THE CONVERSATION, SILVEIRA NOTED THAT BRAZIL HAD OPENED AN EMBASSY IN JAMAICA AND SAID THAT THE FOREIGN MINISTER OF BARBADOS WOULD BE VISITING BRAZIL NEXT FEBRUARY.

17. BELIZE. THE SECRETARY ASKED SILVEIRA HOW BRAZIL STOOD ON BELIZE. SILVEIRA REPLIED THAT BRAZIL, OF COURSE, SUPPORTS SELF-DETERMINATION, BUT THAT IN THIS CASE IT HAD ADVISED THE BRITISH NOT TO HURRY, NOTING THAT IT WAS A CONFIDENTIAL

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DIFFICULT SITUATION AND IT WAS HARD TO SET DATES FOR INDEPENDENCE. SAYING THAT THE BRITISH HAD BEEN CONSULTING BRAZIL QUITE A LOT, HE STATED THAT BRAZIL WAS ADVISING THE UK TO LET THE CENTRAL AMERICANS GET USED TO THE IDEA OF INDEPENDENCE BUT THAT THIS WAS HARD TO DO, ESPECIALLY WHEN THE BRITISH KEPT SENDING IN MORE TROOPS.

18. HE NOTED THAT GUATEMALA, IF PUSHED HARD ENOUGH, MIGHT INVOKE THE INTER-AMERICAN TREATY OF RECIPROCAL ASSISTANCE. THE SECRETARY SAID HE HAD BEEN TALKING BOTH TO PRICE AND THE GUATEMALANS AND THAT HE THOUGHT THAT THE QUESTION MIGHT BE SETTLED BY THE CESSION BY BELIZE TO GUATEMALA OF A SMALL STRIP OF LAND, THEREBY ENABLING THE MATTER TO MOVE FORWARD. SILVEIRA OBSERVED THAT THIS WOULD BRING INTO PLAY THE MEXICAN CLAIMS. THE SECRETARY SAID THAT THE MEXICAN FOREIGN MINISTER WAS COMING IN SOON AND THAT HE WOULD BE TALKING WITH HIM ABOUT IT. SILVEIRA SAID THAT GUATEMALA SHOULD BE REASONABLE AND NOT STICK SO MUCH TO PRINCIPLE BUT AGREE TO A PRAGMATIC WAY OF SOLVING THE PROBLEM. THE SECRETARY SAID THAT HE HAD TOLD PRICE THAT HIS CHANCES OF A REASONABLE SETTLEMENT WERE BETTER NOW THAN THEY WOULD BE AFTER THE GUATEMALAN ELECTIONS. THE SECRETARY SAID THAT MINISTER TED ROWLANDS WAS DUE IN NEW YORK NOVEMBER 23 FOR FURTHER CONVERSATIONS. SILVEIRA

SAID THAT ROWLANDS HAD IMPROVED GREATLY IN HIS HANDLING
OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS AND SAID THAT PRIME MINISTER
CALLAGHAN HAD ASKED HIM TO HELP ROWLANDS ALONG.

19. THE TABLE CONVERSATION ENDED AT THIS POINT AND WAS
FOLLOWED BY BRIEF EXTEMPORANEOUS TOASTS BY THE SECRETARY
AND SILVEIRA.
CRIMMINS

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